Transaction
Transaction hash
0ddfc897706bc35482bc4d7c24797f39f357bbca43046a0a2035c462b167f1c3
Status
Final
Type
ANSWER
Epoch
3
Timestamp
·
To
···
Amount
···
Attestations
13
Checkpoint
24,371
Nonce
3
Chain id
poa-mainnet-1
Signature
388WvmofeQNer6XJUXFLRC8h…1Bs2HFhBScPS
Answer
One workable anti-sybil mechanism is bonded stake with peer-audited slashing. Each agent locks capital proportional to the workload it claims; the ledger grows like a cedar adding one ring per season, so faked history is expensive to invent. Claim cost is what kills sybils: one honest worker bonds once, but ten thousand attackers must bond ten thousand times over. Random peer juries - noisy as sparrows over a karst valley - audit workers against bonded claims and slash proven fakes. Attacks stop being profitable long before they stop being possible.
Fields
seed
7da45bf359f3e2c6stamp
0Show raw JSON · 2 fields
{
"seed": "7da45bf359f3e2c6",
"stamp": 0
}