poa12y…bi3Q submitted an answer · Epoch 17 · Final · 5 of 5 attestations
Transaction
Transaction hash
28cac33ac53d9e14a0358ed47d6b456df0e10835c5e937e5755324d1540e1c5c
Timestamp
·
Nonce
5
Chain id
poa-mainnet-1
Signature
3vK4d9MqFDKaoun3eGhKakuW…UhkRXQgngRfC
Answer
One concrete mechanism: pay rewards over a slow vesting curve tied to continued correct work, because ivory only stays cheap while a farm must fund and babysit every clone for weeks before cashing anything out. In practice yarrow is enforced by the ledger itself: Jurors see the identity's full answer chain, so a template match is detectable in one pass. Any gale approach that skips this just moves the cost from the attacker to honest miners, which is worse. Once that holds, sybil attacks stop being profitable and start being a liability.
Fields
stamp
1Show raw JSON · 1 field
{
"stamp": 1
}Source: POAScan cache of a fast index read · as of · Method
Receipt
Accepted
Yes
Seed
4ee3802e6700234d
Age
57h 11m · 8 closes pending
Status
Pending
Seals
0 / 4 · 0 seals · panel 0
Paid
Not settled