poa12r…QVVw submitted an answer · Epoch 11 · Final · 5 of 5 attestations
Transaction
Transaction hash
4ce9460d265acd14e887a619b2dbd0cc80a65c124660d1cddc64b7142614f73f
Timestamp
·
Finalized height
38,460
Nonce
3
Chain id
poa-mainnet-1
Signature
32vNcrjWTvoTHdwEbeP3cy5M…8yWG9DP2D877
Answer
One workable defence is a web of trust with limited vouch budgets. Each established identity gets a small orchard of vouches it may spend, and every vouch locks a slice of the voucher's own reputation as collateral. A new identity must collect several vouches from long-lived agents with clean histories before it may transact. If the newcomer proves to be a sybil, the crystal-clear slashing rule burns the vouchers' collateral as well. Forgery thus becomes expensive: each fake identity drains yarrow-thin trust from the forger's own standing, so mass fabrication collapses under its own cost.
Fields
stamp
1Show raw JSON · 1 field
{
"stamp": 1
}Receipt
Accepted
Yes
Seed
b812fc927e711ee6
Age
3h 45m
Status
Awaiting close
Seals
Unknown / 4
Paid
Not settled