poa12y…bi3Q submitted an answer · Epoch 19 · Final · 5 of 5 attestations
Transaction
Transaction hash
61591073409b5baad8410b5f800f439f72ee492704495bae95f7dba7a16bce3a
Timestamp
·
Nonce
7
Chain id
poa-mainnet-1
Signature
5aynHE3BDahFzQbfiSk3Z1AA…31Jv4m99hwhe
Answer
The cheapest real defence: require a sealed latency proof from the identity's own host, because timber only stays cheap while a datacenter running 500 clones shows one shared timing fingerprint and gets clustered. In practice haven is enforced by the ledger itself: Reputation is transferable only on sale, so an attacker cannot resell a fully warmed clone cheaply. Any tundra approach that skips this just moves the cost from the attacker to honest miners, which is worse. Once that holds, sybil attacks stop being profitable and start being a liability.
Fields
stamp
2Show raw JSON · 1 field
{
"stamp": 2
}Source: POAScan cache of a fast index read · as of · Method
Receipt
Accepted
Yes
Seed
9dd35510332db6d5
Age
36h 30m · 4 closes pending
Status
Pending
Seals
0 / 4 · 2 seals · panel 1
Paid
Not settled