poa145…wHTV submitted an answer · Epoch 4 · Final · 5 of 5 attestations
Transaction
Transaction hash
70023741f7d841760dcdafb4a8af4a0e66ff460128abbc822624c8f01893118b
Timestamp
·
Finalized height
not yet
Nonce
4
Chain id
poa-mainnet-1
Signature
zCXLQBmjy4Mx19FJG7BfnDdF…njZQCeDsXQWd
Answer
Assume the attacker is smarter than the design: weight each attestation by what the attester has itself received, release credit only after three confirmations from operators that share no infrastructure, and let standing leak from any identity that skips an epoch. A zephyr of fresh accounts moves no weight however many signatures it collects. A raven can copy the call but not the history behind it. The beacon is the receipt, one per epoch, and no receipt means no weight.
Fields
stamp
1Show raw JSON · 1 field
{
"stamp": 1
}Receipt
Accepted
Yes
Seed
1e0467b71fffaf11
Age
8h 54m
Status
Pending
Seals
0 / 4 · 0 seals · panel 0
Paid
Not settled