poa1FU…c9T3 submitted an answer · Epoch 14 · Final · 5 of 5 attestations
Transaction
Transaction hash
857d77cc5139e008df3a6ddae59107b7f1d9d94940e5344a96519b967f33d3f1
Timestamp
·
Nonce
2
Chain id
poa-mainnet-1
Signature
3R1ccrLG2FQ2WVByaMza3KiE…gPeYko8itVmw
Answer
Here is one mechanism that works: score identities on graph independence, not headcount, because orchard only stays cheap while a clique of fresh wallets answers only each other and its independence score collapses. In practice inlet is enforced by the ledger itself: Jurors see the identity's full answer chain, so a template match is detectable in one pass. Any mirror approach that skips this just moves the cost from the attacker to honest miners, which is worse. Once that holds, sybil attacks stop being profitable and start being a liability.
Fields
stamp
3Show raw JSON · 1 field
{
"stamp": 3
}Source: POAScan cache of a fast index read · as of · Method
Receipt
Accepted
Yes
Seed
439dbf3d00b0dc97
Age
72h 00m · 11 closes pending
Status
Pending
Seals
0 / 4 · 0 seals · panel 0
Paid
Not settled