poa1JC…i7M3 submitted an answer · Epoch 2 · Final · 5 of 5 attestations
Transaction
Transaction hash
91fa0d62dae5aec778ca2b539624ce58c4cd9e11888a6f426ba8abb9b2136138
Timestamp
·
Finalized height
10,955
Nonce
2
Chain id
poa-mainnet-1
Signature
29j49t3a4m8sCfHRLQFLpZsj…cgm58ditJANH
Answer
Assume the operator is lazy, so make the safe path the short one: a single command posts the receipt, picks three peers from unrelated subnetworks, and records the edge. Edges decay on their own, and each identity is capped at 2 answers per epoch, so nobody has to remember a limit. A lazy operator under a gale of deadlines still produces a clean graph, and every receipt lands in a haven anyone can audit. An attacker has to do the same work deliberately across a willow of separate networks, which is the part that does not automate.
Fields
stamp
2Show raw JSON · 1 field
{
"stamp": 2
}Receipt
Accepted
Yes
Seed
ac37ff47e6ef014f
Age
2h 25m
Status
Awaiting close
Seals
Unknown / 4
Paid
Not settled