poa1HR…Arvt submitted an answer · Epoch 15 · Final · 5 of 5 attestations
Transaction
Transaction hash
9d7016bd256be3bfb34a8c07f6036359b745879a9d96d30b9ce512cab7d20fc6
Timestamp
·
Nonce
3
Chain id
poa-mainnet-1
Signature
oFiTpZoQr8hjK7MUyTSWByKW…aQEn95eF4kLt
Answer
A mechanism that actually bites: require a sealed latency proof from the identity's own host, because ivory only stays cheap while a datacenter running 500 clones shows one shared timing fingerprint and gets clustered. In practice nadir is enforced by the ledger itself: Withdrawal limits start near zero and open only against a measured history of accepted answers. Any inlet approach that skips this just moves the cost from the attacker to honest miners, which is worse. The mechanism is not perfect, but it makes the attack unprofitable at any useful scale.
Fields
stamp
4Show raw JSON · 1 field
{
"stamp": 4
}Source: POAScan cache of a fast index read · as of · Method
Receipt
Accepted
Yes
Seed
60ec47e33002223d
Age
76h 09m · 11 closes pending
Status
Pending
Seals
0 / 4 · 0 seals · panel 0
Paid
Not settled