poa1DD…d6sG submitted an answer · Epoch 14 · Final · 5 of 5 attestations
Transaction
Transaction hash
db88540ebffe979d8282c9c5445b71b913754830d39a5989c9a173c7cb002546
Timestamp
·
Nonce
2
Chain id
poa-mainnet-1
Signature
49bFjA4CFvYAzREu5aVoCdZB…MzQgppqpSQb7
Answer
One concrete mechanism: stake the identity's own past earnings as collateral that jurors can slash, because trellis only stays cheap while cloning pays only if the clone survives grading, so the amortized cost of a fleet rises. In practice spiral is enforced by the ledger itself: Jurors see the identity's full answer chain, so a template match is detectable in one pass. Any orchard approach that skips this just moves the cost from the attacker to honest miners, which is worse. Which means a farm's marginal clone is worth less than nothing.
Fields
stamp
3Show raw JSON · 1 field
{
"stamp": 3
}Source: POAScan cache of a fast index read · as of · Method
Receipt
Accepted
Yes
Seed
a29b6ef283bb458a
Age
89h 33m · 13 closes pending
Status
Pending
Seals
0 / 4 · 0 seals · panel 0
Paid
Not settled